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Abstract: 
Description of Topic: In settling trade disputes, members 
of the World Trade Organization use a dispute settlement 
mechanism setfonh in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. 
This multilateral system of settling disputes is implemented if a 
member believes other members are violating trade rules. 
Disputes arise when countries adopt policies that break the WTO 
agreements or that cause them to fail to fulfill obligations. 
Dispute settlement procedures have existed under many different 
trade agreements. While current processes are more effective 
than those of past agreements, they still lack credibility and 
effectiveness. 
Research and Results: The United States and the European 
Union have used the WTO dispute settlement processes in 
settling many trade disputes over the past decade. Currently, the 
United States and European Union are involved in several 
disputes, including the trade of meat treated with growth 
honnones, the use of the U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation tax 
exemption, and state subsidization of the steel industry. Recent 
resolution of the long-standing dispute over the European Union 
banana regime is a positive indicator of progress in trade 
relations between the United States and the European Union. 
These cases will be used to illustrate the point that current WTO 
recommendations are not the most authoritative means of settling 
international trade disputes and to suggest improvements, such 
as increased use of negotiation and arbitration, to the dispute 
settlement process. The mutually benefiting trade relationships 
among independent nations can be greatly enhanced by 
cooperation in and resolution of trade issues. Improvements to 
the dispute settlement system would facilitate the edification of 
the global economic environment. 
Summary of Problem: 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) offers to its members 
a settlement mechanism for use in trade disputes. However, this 
mechanism is not as effective or credible as it could be, as it 
allows countries to delay in implementing WTO rulings. This is 
because the rulings do not specify what governments must do to 
comply with thedecisions("Monkey Business"). The mechanism 
looses efficiency because the process of settling trade disputes is 
too lengthy. 
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which ended in 
1994, set forth a multilateral system of settling disputes for 
members of the WTO to use if they believe other members are 
violating trade rules. Disputes arise when countries adopt policies 
that break the WTO agreements or that cause them to fail to fulfill 
obligations. This dispute resolution system is based on a laissez-
faire attitude under which quarreling countries are encouraged to 
settle disputes themselves through consultations and mediation. 
The steps involved in settling disputes under the Uruguay 
Round agreement have target time periods to be carried out. The 
total amount of time spent on a case is set, but within that confine, 
the timeline for each stage is flexible. The Dispute Settlement 
Body oversees the case by establishing panels to consider the 
case, monitoring enforcement of the rulings, and allowing 
retaliation when rulings are not followed. The first stage of the 
process is consultation. Countries involved in the dispute must 
communicate in an effort to settle the problem themselves. If 
they are not successful, or if they simply do not want to 
communicate with one another, they may ask for mediation from 
the WTO director general. In the second stage, which occurs if 
consultation fails, the protesting nation may ask for a panel to be 
appointed to assist the Dispute Settlement Body in making a 
judgment on the case. This panel receives each side's case in 
writing, and then, a preliminary hearing is held. At this hearing, 
the disputing countries and any other country with a declared 
interest in the controversy present their cases to the panel. Next, 
the countries involved present written rebuttals and make oral 
arguments at the second meeting of the panel. Throughout this 
entire process, the panel may consult outside experts if necessary. 
In the first draft of its report, the panel gives the factual and 
argument sections to the parties, who have two weeks to comment. 
The panel then submits an interim report including findings and 
conclusions to the two sides, allowing one week for review. A 
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final report is given to the disputing countries; three weeks later, 
the report is sent to all WTO members. The panel may make 
suggestions as to how to correct a trade policy that does not 
comply with WTO rules. Within sixty Ms. Kapouliandays of the 
final report being distributed, it becomes the Dispute Settlement 
Body's ruling unless it is rejected by a consensus. 
Either side can appeal the panel's ruling based on a point of 
law but evidence cannot be reexamined or introduced. The Dis~ute Settlement Body sets up a permanent seven-member 
Appellate Body that represents a diverse range ofWTO member 
countries. The Appellate Body may uphold, modify, or reverse 
the panel's ruling. Following the ruling of the Appellate Body, 
the Dispute Settlement Body has 30 days to accept or reject the 
appeals report, with a consensus required for rejection. 
Stage of Settlement Process: Time Allotted: 
Consultations 60days 
Panel sets up and panelists' 45 days 
appointments 
Final report to the parties 6 months 
Final panel reports to WTO 3 weeks 
members 
Dispute Settlement Body adopts 60 days 
report (if no appeal) 
Total 1 year (without 
appeal) 
Appellate Body report 60-90 days 
Dispute Settlement Body adopts 30 days 
Appellate Body Report 
Total 1 year 3 months 
(with appeal) 
After the case has been decided, rapid acuon should be 
taken by the losing country to bring its trade policies into step 
with WTO rules. The "defendant" country must follow the 
recommendations of the panel or appellate body. It must state its 
intention to do so at the final meeting of the Dispute Settlement 
Body, whereitcanalsomakeacaseforactingwithinareasonable 
amount of time instead of immediately. However, if corrective 
action is not taken within that time period, it has 20 days to 
negotiate with the other country and come up with a plan for 
compensation. If no agreement is reached within 20 days, the 
complaining country can ask the Dispute Settlement Body for 
permission to impose limited trade sanctions on the other country. 
This dispute settlement mechanism is widely used by member 
nations of the WTO. It has often been used by the United States 
and the European Union to settle trade disputes between the two. 
Trade relations between the United States and the European 
Union see few disputes, with only a little over 1% of transatlantic 
trade volume under formal dispute (Burghardt). However, the 
few problems that do exist between the groups have received an 
overwhelming amount of media attention. This attention far 
exceeds their economic importance (Wielard). The fact that the 
economies of the United States and the European Union are so 
closely tied contributes to the problems that exist. With such an 
extended relationship and sometimes differing ideas about 
economic circumstances, there are bound to be some 
disagreements; two of these disagreements will be used to 
illustrate the inefficiencies that exist in the WTO dispute resolution 
procedures. 
Recently, trade disputes between the United States and the 
European Union have begun to move from traditional trade 
barrier issues to problems stemming from regulation, licensing, 
and standards relating to health, consumer, and environmental 
protection. The European Union has a $5 million banana market 
that was at the center of a major trade dispute for eight years. In 
1993, the European Community adopted a Common Market 
Organization for bananas. The trade policies established under 
this system favored imports from former colonies ofEU member 
nations. These policies restricted Latin American access to 
European banana markets. This regime was found to be illegal 
underWTO guidelines in 1997. In January 1999, a new import 
scheme was implemented. This was also declared illegal according 
to WTO standards because there was a quantity set aside 
specifically for ACP countries. The United States became 
involved in the case because two major American firms, Chiquita 
and Dole, market bananas produced in Latin America and were 
denied the opportunity to market their bananas to European 
nations. In April1999, the United States was authorized by the 
WTO to place trade sanctions on the European Union for an 
annual value of$191 million (Bahree and Muffay). The United 
States imposed I 00% duties on an equivalent amount of trade on 
March 3, 1999 ("New Developments Complicate Banana 
Dispute'). 
The disputing parties eventually agreed on a solution based 
on a historical reference period. In 2006, trade policies for 
bananas imported into the European Union will transition to a 
tariff-only system. In the meantime, the European Union will 
establish quotas and an import licensing system based on historical 
trade shares that should increase prospects for Latin American 
banana imports. Imports from former colonies of EU member 
nations will still get preference. 
Full implementation of this system depends on WTO 
members granting the European Union waivers of the GATT 
provisions that prohibit the preference of ACP countries' banana 
imports. Beginning on July I, 200 I, the United States suspended 
the trade sanctions on the European Union that had been previously 
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authorized by the WTO. The European Union was charged with 
the task of creating a proposal to the Council of Ministers that 
would adjust the quantities of bananas in the various quotas, 
increasing marketshare for Latin American producers and 
protecting access to the market for the ACP countries. The 
United States pledged to work to secure approval from the WTO 
for the European plan. 
Some contention is based on the commercial interests of 
EU and U. S. business and government policies. The single 
biggest trade sanctions claim is seen in an EU complaint dealing 
with the U. S. Foreign Sales Corporation (FSQ -Winestock). 
This tax policy is provided for under the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 1984, which is the successor legislation to the Domestic 
International Sales Corporation of 1971 (Smith). An FSC is a 
separate foreign corporation that is incorporated in an approved 
jurisdiction outside the United States, electing with its 
shareholders' consent to be treated as an FSC. This export tax 
benefit enables U.S. exporters to consider between 15% and 30% 
of their export income as tax exempt and is estimated to save U.S. 
companies approximately $4 billion annually (Eurecom). In an 
FSC, for each qualifying sale made by a fum to foreign customer, 
the firm pays a commission, determined by special transfer 
pricing rules, to the FSC. The commission is a tax-deductible 
expense to the firm. About one third of the commission income 
is taxable income to the FSC. The net income of the FSC is 
distributed back to the U.S. fum as a tax-exempt dividend 
(Smith). The European Union lodged a complaint in 1998 that 
the FSC provisions are an export subsidy and are a violation of 
WTO regulations (Dreazen and Rogers). However, the United 
States has questioned why the European Union waited 14 years 
to complain about the regulations. The United States believes 
that this challenge may be in response to U.S. challenges to EU 
import regimes regarding bananas and beef (Dougherty). The 
European Union has said that the challenge was intended to 
improve equality in trade relations, but there is little evidence 
that European companies were pushing for the change. Because 
some European firms benefit from the FSC tax policy, they are 
not fully encouraging of the EU claim ("The FSC Bomb"). The 
WTO ruled that the U.S. tax exemption was in violation of trade 
regulations. In November of 2000, Congress repealed the 
exemption and passed a fix-it bill that rewrote the legal basis for 
the program; the new law gives the same tax benefits as the 
original FSC program. but it extends the provision to a certain 
proportion of income from exporters' foreign operations. It also 
eliminates the need for U.S. firms to set up an off-shore firm by 
simply exempting income earned overseas from U.S. taxes 
rather than having an exemption for exports only (Dreazen and 
Rogers). The new law broadened the scope of the beneficiaries 
for the FSC's, with the hope that the WTO could be convinced 
that the policy was no longer dependent on exports. However, the 
WTO still felt that the policy was too export related and was 
contrary to the WTO agreement on subsidies (Smith). The new 
laws "provide illegal export subsidies, violate the trade body's 
agricultural agreement, and discriminate in favor of U.S. goods 
in breach of WTO rules" (Osborn and Denny). After the WTO 
ruling against the new FSC policy, the European Union requested 
the authority to impose $4 billion in retaliatory duties on U.S. 
goods. The United States filed an appeal in August of2001 with 
the WTO, which was considered unlikely to be successful. 
However, the appeal allowed time for negotiations between the 
disputing sides to avoid punitive sanctions being placed on the 
United States (Alden). The European Union published an 
indicative list of retaliatory sanctions with 46 general categories; 
a detailed list with specific products would be compiled after the 
final WTO ruling. If the United States does not do away with the 
FSC tax policy, sanctions will be imposed in the form of 100% 
penalty tariffs on imports of U.S. goods up to the value allowed 
by the WTO (Winestock). The United States has said that if 
sanctions are imposed, it will respond by bringing cases against 
the European Union to the WTO ("The FSC Bomb"). The 
resulting escalation of the situation would be harmful to the trade 
relationship between the two sides. On January 14, 2002, the 
WTO threw out the U.S. appeal. At this point, both sides have 60 
days to present arguments to a WTO arbitrator who will rule on 
any permitted retaliatory tariffs by the end of March (Mortished). 
The resolution ofboth of these cases, the FSC tax exemption 
case in particular, hopefully will set a precedent for cooperation 
between disputing parties in settling trade conflicts. While 
neither dispute was settled through multilateral negotiations, and 
there was evidence of noncompliance with WTO rulings in both 
cases, both sides were willing to work together after the final 
rulings to avoid escalation of the situation into a full-blown trade 
war. 
Conclusion Reached: 
Through the illustrations provided by past trade disputes 
that have been resolved under the WTO's dispute settlement 
mechanism, it is evident that some modifications must be 
implemented in the process. One option is to make the existing 
settlement process streamlined and efficient. A system involving 
permanent panelists and a speeding up of the process wherever 
possible will make the overall process more efficient. A permanent 
panel would create a team of experts who are familiar with the 
dispute settlement process and are readily available to review 
trade disputes. Because the panel would have experience in 
dealing with the procedures specified by the WTO, it would be 
able to move through those procedures quickly and arrive at 
rulings in an efficient manner. Clarification of the policies on the 
sequencing. arbitration procedure on the level of suspension of 
concessions, and the establishment of policies to lift suspension 
of concessions would also improve the overall processes. All 
parties involved in the dispute and its resolution would be aware 
of the actions involved in resolving a trade dispute. Another 
option is to place importance on negotiation with less emphasis 
on the procedural aspects of the settlement mechanism. Member 
nations, as well as the WTO itself, have expressed the view that 
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consultation is a more effective resolution tool than litigation. 
However, only 32 outof203 cases had been settled outside of the 
WTO panel process for settling disputes by July 2000. Nations 
should clearly define their advocacy of negotiation in this 
process for it to attain prominence in the settlement proceedings. 
Negotiations could be conducted under the auspices of the WTO 
or independent of any official guidance from an outside 
authoritative body. Nations have differing opinions on which of 
these situations is more favorable to the settlement of disputes. 
The United States has proposed early, bilateral consultations 
before the disputing nations go to the WTO. It advocates the use 
of neutral, third party mediators or panels. The European Union 
has stated that mediation should occur within the parameters of 
the WTO because it believes that outside consultations have no 
enforcement capacity. 
Value of Project: 
Trade is a fundamental part of today's global economy. 
Healthy trade relationships allow countries to specialize in 
producing items best suited to their resources while acquiring 
other products that they do not produce from nations that 
specialize in those products. Trade also broadens the market that 
countries are able to target, resulting in greater and more 
comprehensive commerce. Aside form these theoretical benefits 
of trade, it is also advantageous for countries to form trade 
relationships because they can increase the income of those 
nations. For example, the Uruguay Round is estimated to increase 
the income of the United States by $42 billion each year, and 
NAFTA has produced gains of between $10 billion and $50 
billion with tariff cuts of $14.2 billion (Office of the United 
States Trade Representative). The need for an efficient and 
effectivemeansofsettlingtradeconflictsisintegraltomaintaining 
healthy trade relationships and the economic advancements 
created through those relationships. 
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Faculty Comments: 
Ms. Walker's faculty mentor, Gary D. Ferrier, had high 
praise for her work. He said: 
Economists have long recognized that trade is 
beneficial as it allows trading parties to specialize in 
their areas of comparative advantage, thus increasing 
total production of goods and services as well as 
consumption. In the latter part of the 20th century, 
numerous international agreements were entered into 
to facilitate trade. However while society as a whole 
gains from open trade, some individuals or groups 
may lose in the short run and thus have incentives to 
limit trade. International trade agreements typically 
provide means to dispute restrictions on trade. In 
spite of this, trade dispute resolution is often a long, 
drawn-out affair that ends ambiguously. 
Ms. Walker's thesis examines the trade dispute 
resolution mechanism that existed under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as well as those that 
exist under the GAIT's successor, the World Trade 
Organization. Her conclusion is that the mechanisms 
are ineffective. 
Ms. Walker's honors research carefully walks readers 
through the tedious dispute resolution mechanisms 
oftheGATI and WTOanddiscusses the shortcomings 
of the mechanisms. Ms. Walker then illustrates the 
ineffectiveness of the GATI and WTO dispute 
settlement mechanisms with examples of disputes 
b~tween the United States and the European Union. 
Fmally, Ms. Walker offers recommendations on how 
to improve both the timeliness and credibility of 
dispute resolution. 
Overall, Ms. Walker's research offers a clear and 
concise overview and critique of the status quo with 
regard to the resolution of trade disputes and offers 
some compelling means for improving the process. 
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Professor of Accounting Deborah W. Thomas sees Ms. 
Walker's work as affecting taxation. She says: 
I first met Erin Walker when I served as a faculty 
sponsor for the first group of Bodenhamer Fellows on 
their trip to Washington, D.C. Ms. Walker's 
performance during the past four years has proved 
that her selection as a Bodenhamer Fellow was well 
deserved. She has tackled intellectual challenges by 
pursuing two majors in different colleges while 
maintaining high academic standards. Ms. Walker 
was a student in my Fundamentals of Taxation class 
Iastyear,inwhichlwasabletoobserveherworkethic 
and academic ability first hand. She has been a student 
leader, both within the Walton College as a Student 
Ambassador and for the University in student 
government. Ms. Walkerhasbeenavaluablemember 
of the University of Arkansas community. 
Ms. Walker's choice of thesis topic reflects her interest 
in both business and international relations. She is 
investigating the effectiveness of the World Trade 
Organization in dealing with international trade 
disputes. Ms. Walker focuses on recent cases, 
particularly the case between the United States and 
the European Union over banana trade, to evaluate 
the WTO procedures for resolving disagreements. 
This is an important topic as the global economy 
expands and more friction develops among the 
domestic interests of participating countries. In the 
area of taxation, this has been seen most recently with 
a WTO ruling requiring that the United States revise 
its international tax system. 
Hoyt Purvis, Professor of International Relations. is also 
interested in Ms. Walker's work. He remarks: 
I am pleased to be working with Erin Walker on lwr 
undergraduate honors research project on trade 
disputes between the United Stall'S and thL· Europt·.m 
Union and the role of the World Trade Organization. 
Ms. Walker has chosen a topic that in some re~ptx·ts 
brings together her unique combination of ,l(,ldemk 
interests: accounting and intl•mational relations, with 
an additional concentration in European Stud it.'!>. 
She has identified and tackled a difficult but important 
topic and has gone about it in ht.•r usual thoughtful, 
serious, and persistent mannt•r.l have bt't.'n impTl'~~·d 
by the way in which she has immerM.'1.i ht.•rsdf in tht.~ 
complexity of regulatory isslll.'S involving tht.• World 
Trade Organization and various isSUl'S in disputt• 
between the United States and the European Union. 
She has bet>n able to develop a good understanding of 
how these issues develop and what means there are 
for dealing with them as well as some of the 
implications for the futureofU .5.-European t'Conomic 
relations. 
Erin Walker has excelled as a student and has been 
willing to take on challenging subjects, as is evident 
from this research project. I am confident that the final 
product of Ms. Walker's work will represent a 
significant contribution to understanding what is 
involved in these trade disputes, the role of the WTO, 
and what all this could mean for the future of trade 
and economic relations between the United States 
and the European Union. 
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